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NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
no other competent evidence to support the witness's testimony the trial
judge could refuse to permit the witness to testify as to his opinion of
the speed of the vehicle when it alone would not be sufficient evidence
on which the jury could base a finding of speed.
Neither of the two previously discussed North Carolina cases 26
specifically stated that such opinion testimony could not be used to
corroborate other evidence, but from the language of those two cases
it would seem that North Carolina might altogether reject such evi-
dence.26 Yet in State v. Fentress,27 the North Carolina court allowed a
witness who did not see the automobile in motion or the accident to
testify that in his opinion the car was traveling eighty-five miles per
hour, based on the sound of the engine and the loud crash. The court
stated: "The evidence of Foster who testified that he heard the car
passing with a great noise and at a rapid rate of speed does not lack
circumstantial support, since its roaring progress stopped with a loud
crash at the point where he found it a moment later, torn to pieces and
its occupants lying on the ground about the wreck."'28
Would not one who actually sees the vehicle in motion and the
collision have a better opportunity to judge the speed of the vehicle than
one who only hears the sound of the motor and the following crash?
It seems that when there is other competent evidence to support a
witness's opinion as to the speed of a vehicle, the jury should be allowed
to hear such opinion unless the witness's observation was so limited that
his opinion is totally lacking in probative value.
ROBERT L. GRUBB, JR.
Evidence-Privileged Governmental Records-
Production and Examination by Trial Judge
The recent decision of the United States Supreme Court in Jencks
v. United States1 has caused a great deal of criticism and controversy.
This Note will be limited to evidentiary questions concerning privileged
governmental records, their production, and examination of them by
See text at notes 1 and 2 supra.
2 But see Jones v. Bagwell, 207 N.C. 378, 177 S.E. 170 (1934), where witnesses
who testified that they saw the automobile immediately after it struck deceased and
while it was coming to a stop were allowed to testify that in their opinion the
automobile was traveling thirty to forty miles per hour when they saw it for the
purpose of inferentially showing a greater speed at the time of impact, and in
corroboration of other evidence.
2 230 N.C. 248, 52 S.E2d 795 (1949).
28 Id. at 251, 52 S.E.2d at 797. But see Tyndall v. Hines Co., 226 N.C. 620,
623, 39 S.E.2d 828, 830 (1946), where the court stated: "Conversely, one who did
not see a vehicle in motion will not be permitted to give an opinion as to its speed.
The opinion must be a fact observed." In Campbell v. Sargent, 186 Minn. 293,
299, 243 N.W. 142, 144 (1932), it was stated: "We do not know of any way by
which one can determine the speed of a car by the noise."
1353 U.S. 657 (1957).
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the trial judge. No attempt will be made to discuss the constitutional
ramifications of the decision.
The Court's determination, that where the government in a criminal
prosecution elects not to comply with an order to produce material in
its possession on the ground of privilege, it must drop the prosecution,
was in accordance with existing law.
2
The Court's holding as to the foundation necessary to support a
motion for the government to produce reports made by the witness to
the government is open to criticism. It was held that the motion need
only be for specific documents that constitute relevant, competent ma-
terial which is outside any exclusionary rule, and that there was no need
to show inconsistency between the testimony at trial and the reports
requested. The relevancy and materiality of the reports are established
when they are shown to relate to testimony of the witness.
3
In reaching this conclusion, the Court stated that Gordon v. United
States4 was not intended to limit production of reports to a case where
there has been a showing of inconsistency between the testimony of the
witness and the reports requested. It is submitted that this is an
untenable position. The Gordon opinion, in considering whether the
defendant has a comprehensive right to see documents in the hands of
the prosecution merely because they might aid in the preparation or
presentation of his defense, stated, "We need not consider such broad
doctrines in order to resolve this case which deals with a limited and
definite category of documents to which the holdings of this opinion are
likewise confined." 5  In addition, Goldman v. United States8 was dis-
tinguished in Gordon because the former did not concern notes used
in court nor was there any proof that the requested documents would
show prior inconsistent statements. Six cases were cited in the Gordon
opinion as supporting its decision. Five of them7 concerned inconsisten-
cy or contradiction in the testimony and the sixth8 concerned letters,
the contents of which the witness testified she had no knowledge. In
the light of these circumstances, it is difficult to support the Court's
2 United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 12 (1953) (dictum) ; United States v.
Beekman, 155 F.2d 580 (2d Cir. 1946); United States v. Krulewitch, 145 F.2d
76 (2d Cir. 1944) ; United States v. Andolschek, 142 F.2d 503 (2d Cir. 1944).
In Arnstein v. United States, 296 Fed 946 (D.C. Cir. 1924), the privilege was
granted in a criminal prosecution, but apparently no consideration was given to
the fact that there might be a distinction between criminal and civil cases, and the
civil rule was applied.
3 353 U.S. at 669.
'344 U.S. 414 (1952).
5 Id. at 418.
8316 U.S. 129 (1942).
United States v. Krulewitch, 145 F.2d 76 (2d Cir. 1944); People v. Davis,
52 Mich. 569, 18 N.W. 362 (1884); State v. Bachman, 41 Nev. 197, 168 Pac.
733 (1917); People v. Schainuck, 286 N.Y. 161, 36 N.E.2d 94 (1941); People
v. Walsh, 262 N.Y. 140, 186 N.E. 422 (1933).8 Asgill v. United States, 60 F.2d 776 (4th Cir. 1932).
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conclusion in Jencks that Gordon was not intended to be so limited in
application.
Moreover, this holding cannot be justified under the provisions of
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Under these rules, docu-
ments may be obtained by motion at any time after the filing of the
indictment or information or by subpoena duces tecum.10 Under the
former, it is necessary that the things sought be objects belonging to the
defendant or taken by seizure or process from the defendant or others l
and FBI reports have been held not to be included.' 2 Furthermore, the
granting of such motion is not mandatory, but is within the discretion of
the trial judge.13 Similarly, it has been held that the use of the subpoena
duces tecum under Rule 17(c) is only a method to shorten trial by
allowing examination and inspection of documents before trial. 14  It
cannot be used to circumvent the above rule that statements to govern-
ment agents are not within the scope of the limited discovery permitted
under these rules.'5
The great majority of both federal and state cases prior to the Jencks
case had required a showing of contradiction between testimony and the
records sought as a foundation for a motion to produce the records.' 0
This rule has been continued almost without exception up to the time of
the Jencks decision.' 7  One reason for denying such motions is to pre-
vent "fishing expeditions" into the case of the prosecution.. 8
Other state' 9 and federal20 cases have denied motions for production
FED. R. Cium. P. 16.
:"FED. R. Calm. P. 17(c).
" Shores v. United States, 174 F.2d 838 (8th Cir. 1949); United States v.
Chandler, 7 F.R.D. 365 (D. Mass. 1947).
"United States v. Black, 6 F.R.D. 270 (N.D. Ind. 1946).
13 United States v. Schiller, 187 F.2d 572 (2d Cir. 1951).
4 United States v. Maryland & Va. Milk Producers Ass'n, 9 F.R.D. 509 (D.
D.C. 1949).
1 United States v. Gogel, 19 F.R.D. 107 (S.D.N.Y. 1956).
16 United States v. Rosenfeld, 57 F.2d 74 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 286 U.S. 556
(1932) (papers of the district attorney); State v. Zimnaruk, 128 Conn. 124, 20
A.2d 613 (1941) (stenographer's copy of statements made by a witness under
questioning by a county detective) ; State v. Lee, 173 La. 966, 139 So. 302 (1932)
(police reports and written statements of witnesses in possession of the state);
State v. Arnold, 84 Mont. 348, 275 Pac. 757 (1929) (statements of witnesses made
in the office of the county attorney, even though the defendant contended that
there were variances in the statements).
17 Scales v. United States, 227 F.2d 581 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 992
(1955), redd per curian, 78 Sup. Ct. 9 (1957); Scanlon v. United States, 223
F.2d 382 (1st Cir. 1955) ; United States v. Lebron, 222 F.2d 531 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 350 U.S. 870 (1955); Shelton v. United States, 205 F.2d 806 (5th Cir.
1953) ; United States v. Simmonds, 148 F.2d 177 (2d Cir. 1945) ; United States
v. Cohen, 145 F.2d 82 (2d Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 799 (1945) ; United
States v Rosenberg, 146 F. Supp. 555 (E.D. Pa. 1956).
" United States v. Rosenfeld, 57 F.2d 74 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 286 U.S. 556
(1932).
"Vaughn v. State, 25 Ala. App. 204, 143 So. 211 (1932); People v. Nields,
49 Cal. App. 4, 192 Pac. 552 (1920); Padgett v. State, 59 So. 946 (Fla. 1912);
People v. Gatti, 167 Misc. 545, 4 N.Y.S.2d 130 (N.Y. County Ct. Gen. Sess. 1938);
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of documents and records at trial on the ground that allowance of such
motion is within the discretion of the trial judge. In 1942, the Supreme
Court stated:
We hold there was no error in denying the inspection of the
witnesses' memoranda . . . . We think it the better rule that
where a witness does not use his notes or memoranda in court, a
party has no absolute right to have them produced and to inspect
them. Where, as here, they are not only the witness' notes but
are also part of the Government's files, a large discretion must be
allowed the trial judge.21
The Jencks opinion impliedly overruled this language.
22
Only a few cases have been found where a motion for production of
records has been granted absent a showing of inconsistency or con-
tradiction.23  In an 1807 decision it was held that it was necessary to
aver only that it "may be material" to compel production of a letter to
the President in the hands of the prosecution. 24  No precedent was
cited. Two federal cases allowed that no contradiction was necessary,
but refused a new trial in one because examination by the trial judge
showed no relevant material 25 and denied the motion for production in
the other because it was not for specific material.2 6 Other recent federal
cases granting motions to produce concerned either inconsistent material
or possible entrapment.2
7
The Jencks decision disapproved the practice of producing govern-
ment documents to the trial judge for his determination of relevancy and
materiality without hearing the accused. It was held that since only
State v. Clark, 21 Wash. 2d 774, 153 P.2d 297 (1944), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 878(1945).
20 United States v. Lightfoot, 228 F.2d 861 (7th Cir. 1956), cert. granted,
350 U.S. 992, reV'd per curiam, 78 Sup. Ct. 10 (1957) ; Simmons v. United States,
220 F.2d 377 (D.C. Cir. 1954); Iva Ikuko Toguri D'Aquino v. United States,
192 F.2d 338 (9th Cir. 1951) ; Kaufman v. United States, 163 F.2d 404 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied, 333 U.S. 857 (1947).
21 Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129, 132 (1942).
22 353 U.S. at 668.
2" State v. Murphy, 154 La. 190, 97 So. 397 (1923) (only witnesses for state
were present when statement sought had been made) ; Sprinkle v. State, 137 Miss.
731, 102 So. 844 (1925) (dying declaration which district attorney testified that
he possessed) ; State v. Tippett, 317 Mo. 319, 296 S.W. 132 (1927) ; Gaffney v.
Kampf, 182 Misc. 665, 49 N.Y.S.2d 151 (Sup. Ct. 1944); People v. Radeloff, 140
Misc. 690, 252 N.Y.S. 290 (N.Y. County Ct. Gen. Sess. 1931). The three previous
cases all granted motions to produce documents on the ground that justice re-
quired no less for a fair trial.
2,United States v. Burr, 25 Fed. Cas. No. 14694, at 191 (C.C.D. Va. 1807).
2 Boehm v. United States, 123 R.2d 791 (8th Cir. 1941).
" United States v. Mesarosh, 116 F. Supp. 345 (W.D. Pa. 1953), Aff'd, 223 F.2d
449 (3d Cir. 1955), rev'd on other grounds, 352 U.S. 1 (1956).27 United States v. Coplon, 185 F.2d 629 (2d Cir. 1950) ; United States v. Alper,
156 F.2d 222 (2d Cir. 1946) ; United States v. Beekman, 155 F.2d 580 (2d Cir.
1946).
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the defense is adequately equipped to determine use of reports for dis-
crediting witnesses, the defense rather than the court must initially be
entitled to see them to determine what use may be made of them. In
so determining, the Court ordered that the reports be delivered to the
defense, despite the fact that the original motion had been for their
production to the court to examine and determine whether they would be
useful to the defense.28 The only thing that can be said concerning
this is that it is a complete reversal of prior practice. Wigmore dis-
cusses with approval the practice of examination by the trial judge. -"
The Court failed to cite a single case where this former procedure had
been deemed improper. Its conclusion is supported simply by stating
that "justice requires no less."30  On the other hand, there are in-
numerable cases allowing such an inspection by the trial judge.81
The effect of the Jencks decision is yet to be measured, but several
things should be noted. As an almost immediate result, Congress
passed the Jencks Bill3 2 to protect FBI files. In brief, it calls for the
trial judge to first examine the material sought if the government con-
tends that it contains any material not related to the subject matter of
the testimony. He will remove such unrelated portions and then de-
liver it to the defendant. If the government refuses to deliver up such
material, the entire testimony will be stricken or a mistrial granted if
the circumstances of the testimony require it.
Another immediate effect of the Jencks decision has been the dis-
missal of a host of cases. According to a magazine summary,33 13 cases
involving 19 defendants on such charges as kidnapping, fraud and
bribery, tax evasion, draft evasion, narcotics violations, forgery, em-
bezzling, and bootlegging were dismissed at various stages of trial.
Thus far, the effect of the Jencks decision has not been as far-
reaching as was originally thought by some. Its application to the
field of pre-trial discovery has not yet been determined, according to
a recent state decision 34 which notes that such discovery was allowed
28 353 U.S. at 669.
"WIGMOOE, EVIDENCE § 2200, at 117-18 (3d ed. 1940).
30 353 U.S. at 659.1E.g., United States v. Lebron, 222 F.2d 531 (2d Cir. 1955); Shelton v.
United States, 205 F.2d 806 (5th Cir. 1953) ; United States v. Coplon, 185 F.2d 629
.(2d Cir. 1950) ; United States v. Beekman, 155 F.2d 580 (2d Cir. 1946) ; United
States v. Cohen, 145 F.2d 82 (2d Cir. 1944); United States v. Krulewitch, 145
F.2d 76 (2d Cir. 1944) ; Boehm v. United States, 123 F.2d 791 (8th Cir. 1941);
Vause v. United States, 53 F.2d 346 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 284 U.S. 661 (1931)
United States v. Rosenberg, 146 F. Supp. 555 (E.D. Pa. 1956) ; United States v.
Flynn, 130 F. Supp. 412 (S.D.N.Y. 1955); United States v. Mesarosh, 116 F.
Supp. 345 (W.D. Pa. 1953), cert. granted, 350 U.S. 922 (1955) ; United States v.
Schneiderman, 106 F. Supp. 731 (S.D. Cal. 1952).
" Pub. L. No. 85-269, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (Sept. 2, 1957).
" U.S. News & World Report, Aug. 30, 1957, p. .58.
"' State v. Thompson, 134 A.2d 266 (Del. 1957).
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in two recent federal cases,35 but denied in a third.36 It cannot be denied
that the case will involve new procedure and more latitude in prepara-
tion of the defendant's case. However, the pessimistic predictions of
doom present in the dissenting opinion of Justice Clark would appear
without foundation, since the decision, in restricting defendant's right
of examination to specific and relevant material, never afforded the
defendant a "Roman holiday." 37
LAURENCE A. COBB
Federal Jurisdiction-Enforcement of Collective Bargaining
Agreements Under Section 301 of Labor-Management
Relations Act
Much of the confusion and uncertainty as to the constitutionality and
proper application of section 301 of the Labor-Management Relations
Act of 1947 (Taft-Hartley Act),' created, at least in part, by the
Supreme Court's treatment of the Association of Westinghouse Salaried
Employees v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. case,2 has now been somewhat
alleviated. By its decision in Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln
Mills,3 the Court has clearly upheld the constitutionality of section 301.
It is not so clear how the Court reconciles its extension of federal
jurisdiction with article III, section 2 of the Constitution4 which limits
"United States v. Frank, D.D.C., June 20, 1957; United States v. Hoffa,
D.D.C June 20, 1957.
"'United States v. Benson, 20 F.R.D. 602 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
37 353 U.S. at 680-81.
161 STAT. 156 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1953).
"(a) Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organiza-
tion representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this
chapter, or between any such labor organizations, may be brought in any district
court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the
amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties.
"(b) Any labor organization which represents employees in an industry affecting
commerce as defined in this Act and any employer whose activities affect commerce
as defined in this chapter shall be bound by the acts of its agents. Any such labor
organization may sue or be sued as an entity and in behalf of the employees whom
it represents in the courts of the United States. Any money judgment against a
labor organization in a district court of the United States shall be enforceable only
against the organization as an entity and against its assets, and shall not be
enforceable against any individual member or his assets."
2348 U.S. 437 (1955).
353 U.S. 448 (1957). The case involved an action brought by a labor union
in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama seeking
specific performance of the arbitration provisions of a collective bargaining agree-
ment The district court exercised jurisdiction and ordered the employer to comply
with the arbitration provisions. The court of appeals, in a split decision,
reversed, holding that although the district court had jurisdiction to entertain
the suit it lacked authority founded on either state or federal law to grant
the relief sought. 230 F.2d 81 (5th Cir. 1956). On certiorari, the Supreme Court
reversed the decision of the court of appeals.
'U.S. CoNsT. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. "The judicial Power shall extend to all
Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United
States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their authority . .. .
